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Summary  findings
The point of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals is  endogenously limited arbitrage, the manufacturing firm
arbitrage between countries with different prices. For  accommodates and the price in the home market falls as
several years, an important issue in the European Union  the volume of parallel trade rises.
has been the evident conflict between differing price  The authors test their hypotheses on data from the
regulations in the member states, on the one hand, and  Swedish market for 1995-98.  Before 1995 Sweden
the consequences of parallel trade, on the other.  prohibited parallel imports of pharmaceutical products,
In the EU, so long as the manufacturer  has placed the  but entry into the European Union, on January  1, 1995,
good on the market voluntarily, the principle of free  required Sweden to allow them.
movement of goods allows individuals or firms within  Simple empirical tests favor the accommodation
the EU to trade goods across borders without the consent  hypothesis with a time lag. Using data from Sweden,
of the producer.  Ganslandt and Maskus find that the prices of drugs
In this context, Ganslandt and Maskus study the  subject to competition from parallel imports increased
effects of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical industry.  less than those for other drugs between  1995 and 1998.
They develop a model in which an original manufacturer  Roughly three-fourths of this effect can be attributed  to
competes in its home market with parallel-importing  the lower prices of parallel imports and one-fourth to
firms.  lower prices charged by the manufacturing firm.
The two key hypotheses in their theoretical analysis  Econometric analysis finds that rents to parallel
are these: First, if the potential for parallel imports is  importers  (or resource costs in parallel trade) could be
unlimited, the manufacturer chooses deterrence and  more than the gain to consumers from lower prices.
international prices converge. Second, with
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Parallel imports are legitimately produced goods imported legally into a country
without  the  authorization  of a  trademark,  copyright, or patent  holder.  The
essential  purpose of such trade  is arbitrage  between countries  with different
prices.  For several years, parallel trade  of pharmaceutical  products  has  been
an important  issue for the  European  pharmaceutical  industry  and  numerous
policy institutions,  including the European Commission, the European Court of
Justice and Member States of the European Union. At the heart  of the issue is
the evident conflict between diverging price regulations in the different Member
States, on the one hand, and the consequences  of parallel trade,  on the other.
The  conflict between market integration  and  market  regulation is widely
recognized. The Commission  notes in its Communication on The Single Market
in Pharmaceuticals (1998) that  "Unless parallel trade can operate  dynamically
on prices, it  creates inefficiencies  because most, but  not  all, of the  financial
benefits accrue to the parallel trader rather  the health care system or patient."
Even so the  Commission concludes that  "...  parallel trade  must  equally  be
seen as an important  driving force for market integration and, consequently, for
achieving the  Single Market."
More recently, both American consumers and policy makers have grown in-
creasingly concerned about  the  relatively high prices of patented  drugs in the
United States.  Several new measures, including direct regulation of drug prices
as well as a policy to admit parallel imports, have been proposed by U.S. pol-
icy makers.  In  an  effort to  reduce drug costs for American consumers both
the  House and  the  Senate approved a  measure in July  2000 that  would per-
mit pharmacists  and wholesalers to import cheaper drugs from other countries
(WSJ, 2000). In December 2000, however, the Clinton Administration  refused
to implement the  bill but  the high prices of patented drugs in US remains an
issue.
The core problem with parallel imports is that  the  welfare effects are  am-
biguous.  A policy that  admits parallel imports of pharmaceuticals involves at
least two important  trade-offs.  In terms of dynamic efficiency, there is a ten-
sion between two major  public-policy objectives; innovation and  development
of new drugs on the one hand and welfare of patients, which may require cost-
containment strategies, on the other.  The research-intensive pharmaceutical in-
dustry relies heavily on patents, which provide a limited period of marketing ex-
clusivity within which innovators may recoup their drug development costs. The
1value of the patent  depends on its scope, including definition of the geograph-
ical area over which patent  rights are exhausted upon first sale.  The narrower
the  area of exhaustion, the  greater the scope for price-differentiation.  Conse-
quently, incentives to innovate are stronger at the expense of consumer welfare
in high-price  countries.  In this  context, permission of parallel imports could
reduce incentives to innovate while consumers in high-price countries gain.'
The  second trade-off involves static  efficiency, which is determined  by the
costs and benefits of parallel trade.  The short-run welfare effect is more likely to
be positive for a country with high pharmaceutical prices when the real resources
used in arbitrage activities are small relative to the effects stemming from price
moderation.  It is worth noting that  a positive static effect of parallel trade is a
necessary but not sufficient  condition for the total effect to be positive.
The tension between policy objectives is evident in EU case law2. The prin-
ciple of free movement of goods allows individuals or  firms within the  EU to
trade goods across borders without the consent of the producer, while national
patents  and trademarks  provide exclusive rights to the producer to determine
where and how to put products on the market.  The European  Court of Justice
has held that  free circulation of goods takes precedence over protection of intel-
lectual property  rights. In Merck v Stephar (C 187/80) the European  Court of
Justice held that  a patent holder marketing its product in two different member
states  cannot prevent arbitrage between the  two local markets,  despite differ-
ences in intellectual property protection in the two countries. Thus, exhaustion
applies upon first sale anywhere in the  EU. Moreover, varying degrees of price
control across countries do not justify prevention of parallel imports from coun-
tries with more rigorous regulations to markets with less rigorous regulations,
as found in Merck v Primecrouwn  (joined cases C-267/95 and  C-268/95).  Fur-
thermore, parallel importers  have limited rights to  use original trademarks  in
marketing their products (Dior v Evora, C-337/95, and BMS  and Others v Para-
nova, joined cases 0-427/93, C-429/93, and C-436/93). Finally, manufacturers
cannot partition  the  single market  by introducing  a  new variety  in member
states,  which could have the  effect of replacing market  authorization  for the
prior variety, where its product is subject to competition from parallel imports
(Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, case C-94/98).
However, exhaustion in the European Union has important limitations.  Most
t Danzon  (1998) argues that a segmented  equilibrium  with price-discriminating  monopolies
can be optimal  from a welfare perspective.
2See Ganslandt  and  Maskus  (2000) for further  details.
2importantly, it does not extend to countries outside the common market (EMI v
CBS, case C-51/75 and Silhouette v Hartlauer, case C-355/96). Thus, the  ECJ
has established a principle of "community exhaustion"  but rejected the idea of
international exhaustion. Moreover,  the principle of community exhaustion does
not extend to cases where the goods are sold in a member state  under a com-
pulsory license, as established in Pharmon v Hoechst (C-19/84).  To summarize,
the  EU system essentially mandates  free parallel imports within its  territory,
despite the existence of national intellectual property regimes and price controls,
so long as the manufacturer has placed the good voluntarily on the market.
Despite the theoretically ambiguous relationship between welfare and paral-
lel trade in R&D-intensive industries, direct estimates of the costs and benefits
of parallel trade  are rare.  The aim of this paper  is, therefore, to study the ef-
fects of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical industry.  Our attention  is limited
to the  static  impacts and  we do not consider the dynamic  effects on R&D in
the  long run.  Thus, the  analysis focuses on explaining the  volume and  costs
of parallel imports,  the entry of parallel importers, the  strategic responses by
pharmaceutical firms, and the effects of these activities on prices.
The motivation for this  limitation is to keep the  analysis tractable  within
the  confines of available data.  Note, however, that  unless we find  a positive
static effect we cannot expect a net positive effect, including dynamic irUpacts,
of parallel trade in pharmaceutical products.
The paper presents a simple two-country model of arbitrage.  Income levels
differ between the two markets and pharmaceutical companies have an incentive
to price-discriminate between markets.  It is assumed that  price ceilings in the
exporting nation are exogenously  given and, accordingly, an optimal system of
price regulation is not  derived.  In the  first specification we assume that  the
potential volume of arbitrage is unlimited. In the second specification we derive
an endogenous choice of maximum potential parallel imports.  While the limit
here is a choice variable, one motivation for this idea is that  parallel importers
could face problems in finding more than  a limited quantity in export markets.
A related  contribution  is Klepper  (1992), who presents a  simple model  of a
price-discriminating monopoly that  is exposed to price controls in-  one market
and faces limited arbitrage between markets.
The theoretical analysis yields a number of hypotheses. First, if the potential
volume of arbitrage is unlimited, the  manufacturing firm would deter  parallel
imports by reducing its price in the home market for products that  are subject
to possible parallel trade.  Second, if the potential volume of arbitrage is small,
3the manufacturing  firm would accommodate parallel imports and the  price in
the home market would fall in the volume of actual parallel trade.
In the  empirical part we informally test  our theoretical hypotheses on data
from the  Swedish market  during  1995-1998. The  Swedish market  provides a
natural  test  for our theoretical  hypotheses.  Before 1995 Sweden prohibited
parallel imports of pharmaceutical products.  However, entry into the European
Union, on January  1, 1995,  required Sweden to allow them.
For this purpose we have compiled a unique set of data consisting of prices for
50 major pharmaceutical products, the sales of patent  holders, the identity and
time of entry of parallel importers, volumes  of parallel imports, and the sources
of parallel imports.  Because we use data assembled on a detailed product  level
the  price comparisons are  not  subject  to  the  methodological problems  with
general price comparisons discussed in Danzon and Chao (1998).We find that
prices in Sweden  of drugs subject to parallel imports have fallen relative to other
pharmaceutical  prices, with the  effect concentrated  at  the  end  of the  period.
However, in a restricted data set we find that parallel imports have not resulted
in convergence  of wholesale prices between Sweden and the countries providing
the exports.
The rest  of this  paper  is organized as follows.  The  theoretical  model of
parallel imports is presented in section 2.  The hypotheses from the theoretical
analysis are investigated in section 3 and section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2  The  Economics  of Parallel  Imports
Consider  a model with two markets - home  and foreign - denoted  h and  f.
Throughout  the  analysis the home market is the high-income country and the
foreign market  the low-income country.  A representative consumer in market
i = h, f  has income mi, where mh >  mf . Demand for a specific pharmaceutical
product is
Di (Pi) = ax-/3iPi  (1)
for market i = h, f,  where ,i  is proportional to the marginal utility of money and
decreasing in mi.3 It is assumed that  no substitution with other pharmaceutical
'This  system of demand functions can approximately  be obtained with a linear-qudratic
utility  function,  i.e. ax - bx
2 /2 + v (y),  as long  as the expenditure  on x is a relatively  small
share  of the  consumers  budget  and  we  make  the  appropriate  variable  substitution,  that  is
a  = a/b  and  8 =  v'(m)/b.  It  is assumed  that  v'(m)  > 0 and  v"(m)  < 0.
4products  or therapies is possible.
The product is patented in both countries and produced by a single manu-
facturing firm at marginal cost c. For simplicity c = 0. The manufacturing firm
sells the product in the home and foreign market at prices ph  and pT, where the
subscript denotes the market and the superscript refers to the firm. Individual
arbitrage between the two markets is prohibited.
There is an autonomous government in the foreign country with a capacity
to  set a  price cap in its  own market without intervention.  The price cap in
market f  is denoted p^f.  The price cap in the foreign market is always binding.
We assume that  there  is a  small number of symmetric parallel-importing
firms, n,  with a total  arbitrage capacity of k, which can be infinitely large or
a binding constraint  depending on the situation.  The marginal cost of parallel
trade is t.  The parallel-imported product is a perfect substitute  to the product
sold by the original manufacturing firm directly to consumers in the local mar-
ket. Firms compete in prices. The parallel-importing firms set a common price
in the import market denoted ph. If the price of a unit sold by the original man-
ufacturer is identical to the  price set by the  parallel-importing firms, then the
consumer buys the  good from the  original manufacturer.  The manufacturing
firm's demand in the import market is
Dhm (Ph ) =  Dh  (Ph)-  k  (2)
The strategic  interaction  is modelled as  a multi-stage  game.  In  the first
stage, each parallel-importing firm i orders a quantity  ki from a wholesaler in
the  foreign market.  The order quantity  ki is immediately made known to all
other firms.  In  the  second stage,  the  manufacturing firm sets prices in both
markets, ph  and p',  subject to the exogenously  given price cap p^. Prices are
made public. In the third  stage, the parallel-importing firm sets a price in the
import market,ships a quantity qi' and markets clear.
In the theoretical analysis we consider two situations.  The first situation  is
a benchmark  with unlimited arbitrage.  More formally, the  arbitrage capacity
ki is not binding in the last stage of the game.
In the  second situation,  arbitrage is limited.  It  is assumed that  the  order
quantity  in the first stage is a  binding constraint  on the  volume of arbitrage.
Parallel importing  firms can choose to limit arbitrage and  the total  volume of
arbitrage is endogenously determined.
52.1  Parallel  imports  lead  to  price  convergence
A natural  benchmark is an  equilibrium in which potential  arbitrage  is unre-
stricted and the maximum volume is never a binding constraint  on the quantity
shipped by the parallel-importing firms. In this case these firms have an incen-
tive to  undercut the  price set by the manufacturing  firm in the  home market
as long as the price difference  is larger than the trade cost. The manufacturing
firm achieves no sales in the home market as long as parallel imports occur. The
only way to obtain  any sales in the  home market is to  deter  parallel imports
by setting a price in the home market that  makes parallel imports unprofitable.
Thus, we define a deterrence strategy as a manufacturer's  price that  precludes
parallel imports.  An alternative strategy is accommodation, in which the man-
ufacturer  permits the  level of trade chosen by the  parallel-importing firms and
prices accordingly.  When potential  arbitrage is unlimited, deterrence is more
profitable than  accommodation.  The deterrence strategy  results in a per-unit
revenue equal to the price in the foreign market plus the trade cost, while under
accommodation the  manufacturer sells only in the foreign market  and its  per-
unit revenue is the foreign price. In other words, price convergence  is a result of
the  manufacturer's  response to potential  arbitrage rather  than  actual  parallel
trade activities.
Proposition  1 Let the potential volume of parallel imports be unlimited.  The
manufacturing firm deters parallel  imports by setting a price in the home market
which makes arbitrage unprofitable. More precisely, ph  =  P^f  + t,  in the unique
equilibrium. The price in the foreign market remains unchanged.
Proof.  If ph  > Pf + t  then the parallel importer sets a price pa =  p,  -e  >
p^f + t  and  the  profit  of the  manufacturing  firm would be  Dh (pa) pf  in the
home market.  But the deterrence profit is Dh  (p^f + t)  (if  + t)  which is higher.
Any price ph'  < Pf + t deters parallel imports  but  results in less profit  than
ph  = Pf  + t.  Hence, by contradiction pf  + t is the unique equilibrium.
This result is worth commentary.  The threat  of parallel imports results  in
price convergence  relative to the segmented equilibrium. More specifically,  prices
converge (up to variable trade cost) due to a price reduction in the home market
while the price in the foreign market remains unchanged. Interestingly, potential
arbitrage is sufficient to induce price convergence and no parallel imports occur
in equilibrium. FRom  a welfare point of view this is desirable as no real resources
are used in arbitrage activities.
6A related  point is that  both the price effect in the home market and price
convergence are unrelated to the volume or share of parallel imports, and  the
change in average price in the  home market is identical to the  change of the
manufacturer's price.
2.2  Costly  trade  activities
The effects of parallel trade  are sensitive to  the  existence of a  constraint  on
the  maximum volume of parallel imports.  In particular,  a quantity  constraint
on parallel trade  gives the  manufacturing  firm an  incentive to  accommodate
rather  than  to deter parallel imports.  The manufacturing firm prefers to sell a
somewhat smaller quantity, specifically  its residual demand, in the home market
at  a higher price instead  of reducing the price sufficiently to preclude parallel
trade.
In the accomnuodation equilibrium the  price difference between the  foreign
and home markets admits profitable arbitrage in the last stage and the parallel-
importing  firms undercut  the  manufacturing firm's price in the  home market
sufficiently to  sell its  whole capacity.  Working backwards we may focus on
the home market in the first stage.  The result from the  last  stage is a  resid-
ual demand for the  manufacturing firm's product in the home market and  the
manufacturing firm solves
Max (a  -/3hphW-k)  ph  + kpf  (3)
The optimum price is
m  =  -
Ph  20  (4)
which we call the accommodation price.  Interestingly, the accommodation price
is falling in the volume of parallel trade, so long as parallel imports are positive.
The equilibrium profit may be obtained by inserting the  accommodation price
in  the  profit  function.  Correspondingly, we obtain  the  deterrence  profit  by
inserting the  deterrence price, p7m  =  p^f + t,  in the profit  function.  The two
profit levels give a condition for deterrence
(a  k) 2 + kPf <  (a-h(f  + t)) (if  + t),  (5)
4flh
where the left hand side is the profit in the accommodation equilibrium and the
right hand  side is the profit from deterrence.  For sufficiently  small k,  the profit
7from accommodation falls in the  volume of arbitrage.4 The profit from deter-
rence increases in the trade  cost.  In other words, accommodation is relatively
more attractive  when the  potential  volume of parallel trade  is small and the
trade cost is relatively high. More formally, we have the following result:
Proposition  2  For a sufficiently small k and t, the manufacturing firn  chooses
not to deter parallel imports.  Moreover, the equilibrium price set by the man-
ufacturing firm in  the home market is falling in the actual volume of parallel
imports.
Proof.  Define the profit from accommodation minus the profit of deterrence
to be
f  (k, t)  - - k)2 + kpf  - (a - Oh  (Pf + t)) (Pl + t),
which is (strictly)  positive for k  =  O,t =  0.  For any  k  the  function is neg-
ative for t  >  ph  - p.  For any given t,  it is negative for k  >  a.  From the
theorem of intermediate  values it follows that  there exist a function k (t)  such
that  f  (k (t) , t) =  0 and  for k  < k (t)  accommodation is more profitable than
deterrence.  Moreover, in this  equilibrium the manufacturer's  price in the home
market is falling in the volume of parallel imports as
dph  1  <  o
which concludes the proof.
The main intuition for the result is straightforward.  First, a small potential
volume of parallel imports hurts the  manufacturing firm's revenue less in the
accommodation equilibrium than does a large volume. A high trade cost, on the
other hand, makes deterrence relatively easy and, thus, less costly for the manu-
facturing firm. A combination of these two effects  gives the main result.  Second,
the accommodation  price falls in the volume of arbitrage for a simple reason.
The direct  effect of a price cut  on revenues is smaller than  in the  segmented
equilibrium since a share of the quantity is sold by the parallel-importing firms.
The manufacturing firm does not internalize the effect on the parallel-importing
firms' profit in reaching its pricing decision in the accommodation equilibrium.
In the  accommodation equilibrium the manufacturing firm sets a price that
is a  function of the  actual volume of arbitrage.  A larger quantity  of parallel
4We derive  the  maximum level of k for which this is true  in the next  sub-section.
8imports results in a lower  price set by the manufacturing firm, though it remains
above the  deterrence price. The proposition, therefore, emphasizes that  actual
parallel imports, rather than potential arbitrage, may be essential for the degree
of international price convergence. In the accommodation equilibrium the real
resources used in arbitrage  activities are increasing in the  volume of parallel
imports.
Note that  the  cost of obtaining price convergence is, however, not  a con-
tinuous function in the potential volume of arbitrage  and trade  cost.  A large
potential  volume and high trade  cost makes deterrence more attractive  to the
manufacturing firm. More formally,
Proposition  3  Let the volume of parallel  import be limited to a maximum quan-
tity o) k  and the cost of parallel imports be t.  The manufacturing firm is more
likely to deter parallel imports when the trade cost, t,  is high or the potential
volume of arbitrage, k, is large.
Proof.  First, the  accommodation profit is falling in k
d  ((  k)2 + kpf  ()=  h  - f)  < °
and for pf  + t < p*, the  deterrence profit is increasing in t
dt dt ((a  - /3 (p  + t)) (f  + t))  = a-  2/h  (Pf  + t) > 0
and a combination of the  two gives the proof
The intuition for this result is similar to that  for the previous proposition.  A
high trade  cost makes deterrence relatively easy and a large volume of parallel
imports makes accommodation costly. Hence, the manufacturing  firm is more
likely to deter  if the  potential volume of parallel imports is large and/or  the
trade cost is high.
The last proposition establishes a link between the potential  volume of par-
allel imports and the  price effect in the  home market, but  no parallel trade  is
actually observed in a deterrence equilibrium. The real cost to obtain full price
convergence  is, therefore, kept at a minimum level. It is worth noting that  high
trade costs make deterrence more likely but the price effect of parallel imports
in the home market is smaller. The reason is that  the manufacturing firm need
not reduce its price as much to deter parallel imports in the home market, since
the trade cost helps to block arbitrage activities.
92.3  Strategic  behavior  by parallel-importing  firms
In the previous  section  we showed  that the manufacturing  firm deters parallel
imports  when  the potential  volume  of parallel  imports  is sufficiently  large. This
is clearly  not a desirable  outcome  for the parallel-irnporting  firms,  which  prefer
an equilibrium  in which  the potential  volume  is limited  and the manufacturing
firm accommodates.  We now  develop  a formal  justification  for the existence  of
endogenously  limited maximum  parallel  trade
First, a commitment  to an upper level  of parallel  imports in the first stage
would  result in accommodation.  Let k denote  the maximum  level  of parallel  im-
ports at which  the manufacturing  firm  accommodates.  The deterrence  condition
(5) gives  the maximum  potential  volume  of arbitrage:
k = a- 21 3hf-
2 0h'/t  Gh  2pf  -t)  (6)
Second,  a commitment  to an upper level  of parallel  imports  removes  some  of
the parallel-importing  firms' incentive  to undercut  each other in the last stage.
Competition  between  these firms  in the last stage is, therefore,  less aggressive.
Working  backward,  each parallel-importing  firm non-cooperatively  choose  to
order a quantity kF  in the first stage. If we  restrict our attention to outcomes
in which  the manufacturing  firm accommodates,  the first order condition  is
a-2k,-Z  k-i -2Ih  (if  + t) =  O  (7)
where -i  k i is the sum of  the ordered  quantities  by all  other parallel-importing
firms  than i. Considering  only  symmetric  equilibria  gives  a total optimal  ordered
quantity kn, which  is
k* =  . +  ,  - h-21h  (Pf + t1  (8)
n  n+1
The profit-maximizing  quantity, however,  must be lower  than the maximum
potential  volume  of arbitrage or else  parallel  imports  are deterred by the manu-
facturing  firm. The maximum  volume  of  arbitrage  is not binding  for  low  variable
trade costs. The profit-maximizing  volume  of arbitrage is less than the maxi-
mum volume  of arbitrage, if t <  t  where
a  - 21hjpf  ,(9)
20h  (2n2  + 2n + 1)(
10The critical level t is falling in the number of parallel-importing firms. The rea-
son is that  the profit-maximizing volume increases with the number of parallel-
importing firms while the maximum volume remains unchanged.
We summarize the  formal results in the following  proposition:
Proposition  4  Let  the ordered volume in  stage one be a  binding constraint
on parallel imports in stage three. In  a symmetric  equilibrium with n parallel-
importing firms  the  total volume of parallel imports is k  =  min {k,k  } and
the manufacturing firm accomodates.  In  this equilibrium, the price in the home
market is falling in the variable trade cost t and falling in the number of parallel-
importing firms.
Proof.  The parallel importing firm prefers the accommodation equilibrium
iff
p'" (k)  - ~f  - t > o  (10)
which is equivalent to k  <  a  -
21h (Pf + t).  The maximum total  volume of
parallel imports in the accommodation equilibrium is k, given by equation (6),
and  the optimal non-cooperative volume is kn, given by equation  (8),  subject
to  the  condition  k.  <  k.  Now, for all pf  and  t  we have k  >  min{k,k*},
which guarantees  that  the  parallel-importing firms prefer the  accommodation
equilibrium over the deterrence equilibrium.
To show the  last part  of the proposition we can use proposition 2 in which
the relationship between the home market price and the volume of arbitrage was
established.  Proposition  2 shows that  the price set by the  manufacturing firm
in the  home market falls in the volume of parallel imports.  Now, the  quantity
of parallel imports depends on the variable trade cost and the number of firms.
More precisely,
dk  20-  <  O  if t < -
dt  <  -- 23vif+tl)<  O if  t > -t(1
t  ,(t(f--2&-
and
dk  =  {  l(!n+t)i  >  °  if t < t  12 dn-S  (n+i)'  - (12)
dn  0  if t>t
which concludes the proof.
11The result  is interesting for several reasons.  First, a  relatively low variable
trade cost makes deterrence costly and the maximum volume of arbitrage in the
accommodation equilibrium is high.  The profit-maximizing parallel- importing
firms, however, prefers to restrict parallel imports to maintain  a higher margin
on the  volume of parallel imports  that  actually take  place.  The volume of
parallel imports is increasing in the number of firms due to the non-cooperative
interaction between the firms. Each such firm will choose its quantity  without
regarding the effect on the profits of other parallel-importing firms.
Second, as the  variable trade  cost increases the  effect of parallel imports
on the price in the  home market is weaker and the equilibrium price is higher.
For a  relatively low variable trade  cost, the  reason is that  the firms choose a
lower volume of arbitrage.  The intuition is that  the marginal revenue remains
unchanged while the marginal cost increases, which results in a lower aggregate
volume of parallel imports.  For a  relatively high variable trade  cost, on the
other hand, the reason is that  deterrence is relatively less costly. The maximum
accommodation volume is, therefore, falling in the variable trade  cost and  the
equilibrium price in the home market is higher.
Our two cases our  illustrated  with Figures la  and  lb.  In both  diagrams,
the manufacturer  sets the monopoly price ph in the segmented equilibrium. In
so doing, the manufacturing firm generates quasi-rents equal to the  area of the
box below the  line extending from ph to  point A.  These quasi-rents  may be
used to cover costs of R&D. In the  deterrence equilibrium in Figure  la,  the
manufacturer  is forced to  reduce price to the  foreign price plus  tariff.  The
result  is a transfer from the manufacturer  to consumers of area (a  + ,)  and
a consumer efficiency  gain of 6.  Furthermore,  area  (-  + p) reflects additional
rents to the manufacturer from the higher sales volume. Here, area  r ordinarily
might be resources wasted in trade but there is no actual trade  in equilibrium.
Although static welfare is higher in the  home market,  this  simply reflects the
gains from wider dissemination of a monopolized good. Because quasi-rents in
the deterrence equilibrium are lower than  in the  monopoly case, the  issue for
policymakers is whether the  loss in quasi-rents,  and the  implied reduction in
future R&D, outweighs the static gains to consumers.
In the accommodation equilibrium in Figure lb,  the parallel-importing firms
sell the  quantity  k in the home market.  The manufacturer acts as monopolist
on the residual demand, generating an equilibrium at point C, with the  manu-
facturer selling volume qh.  The consumer efficiency  gain is area a.  The man-
ufacturer loses quasi-rents equal to the box to the left of point A plus area A
12(transferred to parallel-importing firms) and area r1 (lost to trade costs)  How-
ever, that  firm gains quasi-rents of area X on additional foreign sales to support
the parallel import volume. In this case profits of area A 2 are generated for the
parallel-importing firms on additional consumption in the home market  (with
their  total rents  equaling area A 1 +  A2).  Resources used in transport  are the
area (r1 +  r2).  The manufacturer would be indifferent between deterrence and
accommodation where (for a given t),  the parallel imports k are large enough
to set residual marginal revenue equal to zero at price pf + t.
For lower import volumes the manufacturer prefers accommodation and for
higher import  volumes the  manufacturer  would deter.  Because the  parallel-
importing  firms understand  this  trade-off, they  would choose a  limited trade
volume. While there are necessarily static overall gains from deterrence (if not
necessarily net dynamic gains), the home economy may be better  off or worse
off strictly in static terms from accommodation. Note that  it matters  for home
welfare whether the  parallel-importing firms are located abroad or at home. If
they are home firms, the net static welfare effect at home is (a  +  A2 - Tl  - r2 +
X), whereas if they are foreign firms, the net static welfare effect at home is (a -
A1 - 71 + X), assuming the  parallel-importing firms absorb the transport  costs.
3  Empirical  Analysis
We now proceed to an empirical analysis of the price effects of parallel imports.
For this purpose we have collected detailed data about the pharmaceutical mar-
ket in Sweden. The Swedish market provides a natural  test for our theoretical
hypotheses.  As Sweden joined the European Union on the  1st of January  1995
the policy on parallel imports was drastically changed. Before 1995 parallel im-
ports of pharmaceutical products were prohibited but they were allowed  January
1 of that  year. 5
The main data  sample was provided by LIF, the Swedish Association of the
Pharmaceutical Industry.  It includes panel data for the 50 molecules with the
highest sales values in the Swedish market in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998.
Approximately 35-38 percent  of the  Swedish pharmaceutical  market in value
terms is included in the data set.
An observation is a "product",  defined as a patented molecule  with a specific
5Parallel imports are subject to a regulatory approval period, which effectively  delayed  the
regime  shift.
13anatomical therapeutic  classification  (ATC) code, form and concentration.  More
specifically,  the  data include 164 different forms and concentrations distributed
over 50 patented molecules. For each product there are quantities and prices for
both original manufacturing firms and all parallel importing  firms on a yearly
,asis.
Moreover, we have collected data on approvals to parallel import the  prod-
ucts  in our  sample  for 1995-1998. An  approval is a  formal decision by  the
Swedish Medical Products  Agency and it  allows a specific parallel importing
firm to import a unique patented molecule in a specific form and  dose from a
specified export country.
In the supplemental sample we have detailed prices for 26 of the 50 molecules
in two main  parallel-exporting countries, Italy  and Spain, for 1995 and  1998.
These prices were obtained  from IMS Health, a  private consulting firm. The
narrow sample was restricted to drugs that  are precisely comparable on an in-
ternational basis. Thus, they have the same ATC code, form, and concentration
and originate from the  same manufacturers  across all markets.
The remaining parts  of this empirical section are an overview of the  phar-
maceutical market in Sweden, an empirical analysis of the  price effects in the
Swedish market and, finally, a test of the price-convergence  hypothesis between
the export and import market.
3.1  The  Pharmaceutical  Market  and  Parallel  Imports
The Swedish pharmaceutical market was approximately 0.8-0.9 percent of GDP
valued at  wholesale prices during the  period 1995-1998. It ranged from 13.393
million Swedish Kronor (SEK) in 1995 to 16.567  million SEK in 1998, as sum-
marized in table  1. Sales were relatively concentrated in a number of patented
molecules. The 50 highest-sold molecules  accounted for a third of the total  mar-
ket.  In  1998 these 50 top drugs accounted for 37 percent  of total  sales in the
pharmaceutical market valued at wholesale prices.
Parallel imports have increased substantially since Sweden  joined the Euro-
pean Union, both in terms of actual sales and approvals to engage in the activity.
In  1995 no parallel imports occurred and no applications to import were filed.
By 1998 parallel imports had grown to 1.007 million SEK, which corresponded
to 6 percent  of the total  market, and 226 approvals to import pharmaceutical
products  had been granted by the Medical Products  Agency. In 1995 no firms
entered  the market and  in 1996 still only one firm was granted  permission to
14start  parallel trade.  However, by 1997  the  number had grown to four firms and
in 1998  the number was ten.  The market was nevertheless dominated by a small
number of parallel importers. The largest parallel-importing firm accounted for
100 percent of total parallel trade in 1996,  85 percent in 1997 and 59 percent in
1998. The four largest companies accounted for 96 percent of all parallel trade
in 1998.
[SEE TABLE 1]
Parallel  imports from  13 different countries had  been approved  by  1998.
The source of parallel imports was, however,  heavily concentrated in a few low-
price countries in Southern Europe.  Two countries, Spain and Italy, were the
exporters in approximately two thirds (63 percent) of all cases. The three most
important  export countries, Spain, Italy  and Greece, accounted for 74 percent
of all approvals.
In  1998 parallel trade  accounted for 6 percent  of the  total pharmaceutical
market in Sweden, which was mainly concentrated in the largest products.  Six-
teen percent of the  sales of the top 50 molecules  was parallel imports,  but the
distribution of parallel trade as a share of total sales for these 50 molecules was
not equal. Measured on a unweighted  product basis the median share of parallel
trade was 0.0 percent and the maximum 72.1 percent. Parallel imports existed
in approximately 15 percent of all products.  Ranking products  from lowest to
highest parallel-import shares,  at  the  95th percentile such imports  accounted
for 53.6 percent of total sales.
A similar picture  appears for approvals on a  product basis.  Approvals to
parallel import  drugs  into Sweden in  1998 were concentrated  in a  few high-
value products.  For 68.3 percent of all products on the top 50 list no entry of a
parallel-importing firm had occurred. More than one approval had been granted
for 21.9 percent of products. 6
To summarize this overview we conclude that  our sample covers approxi-
mately 38 percent of the pharmaceutical market in Sweden. The growth of par-
allel imports from  1995 to 1998 was considerable and  such imports accounted
for 16 percent of sales in 1998. A large and rapidly growing number of parallel-
importing  firms entered the  market,  in some cases to  sell the  same products
6Eighteen approvals had been granted for one specific  product.  That this number could
be so large has two explanations.  First,  for some products a specific parallel-importing
firm was approved to import the goods from several exporting countries. Second, more than
one parallel-importing  firm had an approval to import certain drugs, possibly from the same
exporting country as other such firms.
15as other firms already present.  Overall, sales are largely accounted for by four
major  parallel importers.  Parallel trade  is concentrated  in a  minority  of the
products in the sample but the share of parallel imports is considerable for ap-
proximately 15 percent of the top-value products.  Italy and Spain are the source
countries for 63 percent of parallel imports.
3.2  Price  effects  in the  Import  Market
Next, consider the effect of parallel imports in the Swedish market.  We start
with a comparison between products which are subject to parallel imports and
products which are not.  For this purpose we calculate the relative price change
for a specific product between a base year (1994 or 1997) and 1998. The relative
price change is defined as the price in SEK in 1998  divided by the corresponding
price in the base year minus one. We calculate the change for the  average price
including parallel imports, referred to as the  "Mean incl.  PI",  as well as the
change for the manufacturing firms' prices.
Table 2 reports  the unweighted and weighted average price changes for all
products.  The unweighted average is a simple arithmetic mean.  In the weighted
average, however, product weights are computed as the product's  sales in 1998
divided by the sum of sales for all products  included in the  average.
[SEE TABLE 2]
Our discussion will primarily focus on the unweighted average.  Over the
whole period 1994-1998  prices increased on average 6.64 percent for all products
and manufacturing firms' prices increased somewhat more at 7.34 percent.  On
average prices for products  subject  to parallel imports  increased 2.88 percent
while manufacturers  raised their  prices 6.38 percent for these products.  As a
contrast, prices for products  not subject to parallel trade rose 7.57 percent.
The difference  was even more pronounced over the shorter period 1997-1998.
Average prices increased 0.25 percent. Average manufacturing firms' prices de-
clined 0.34 percent for products subject to parallel trade but rose 0.95 for prod-
ucts not subject  to parallel imports.  Prices of parallel-imported-products  fell
on average by 3.12 percent.
This first overview seems to confirm that  prices of parallel-traded  products,
and products facing such actual competition, fell in the  import market relative
to  the  prices of products  not subject  to parallel trade.  The main  effect, ap-
proximately three quarters of the fall, results from parallel trade itself while the
16remaining effect is the change in manufacturing firms' prices.
We undertake  simple tests of the hypotheses generated by our two models.
First, to test whether the differences between the change in the manufacturing
firms' prices for products subject and not subject to parallel imports are signifi-
cant, we perform t-tests,  assuming unequal variances, of the hypothesis that  the
mean change is the same.  The hypothesis that  the  manufacturing firms' price
changes for goods facing parallel imports and those not facing such imports is
the same cannot be rejected at the ten-percent level of significance for the period
1994-1998  (t = 0.4324). The hypothesis is, however, rejected at the five-percent
level for 1997-1998 (t = 1.7679), which confirms that  the manufacturing firms'
prices increased significantly less for products subject to parallel imports than
did prices of other products in the end of the period.
An additional t-test confirms  that  the mean price change for parallel-imported
products was significantly lower than  the mean for non-parallel-imported prod-
ucts for 1994-1998 (t = 1.6854) and 1997-1997  (t = 4.8160).
A third hypothesis, that the  average change of parallel-imported goods and
the manufacturer's price change for non-parallel-imported products is the same
during  1994-1998 cannot be  rejected  (t  =  1.0255).  However, this  difference
becomes significant at the  one-percent level for 1997-1998  (t = 2.6297) .
Our preliminary conclusion is, therefore, that  the data support  the model of
accommodation rather  than  deterrence since the change of the  manufacturing
firms' prices is not significantly different between goods facing parallel imports
and other  goods.  However, the  mean price, including both parallel-imported
goods and manufacturers'  prices in those goods, increased significantly less than
the manufacturing firms' prices not facing such competition.  Over the short pe-
riod 1997-1998,  the change of the manufacturing firms' prices was significantly
lower for products  facing import competition than  for other drugs.  This re-
sult  suggests that  manufacturing firms react to the volume of arbitrage with a
lag, rather  than  trying to deter parallel imports before they actually enter the
market.
To investigate this  finding further  we examine statistically how changes in
manufacturers' prices are affected by the share of parallel trade andcthe approval
of parallel imports.  We define PI SHARE, which takes values between 0 and 1,
as the share of parallel trade in total sales for a specific product.  The variable
APPROVAL is a  dummy equal to  one when there  is at  least  one  approval
in 1998 to  parallel  import the  product  and  zero otherwise.  The  dependent
variable, defined at  the  individual product  level, is the  relative price change
17of the  manufacturing  firms' price over the  periods  1995-1998, 1996-1998 and
1997-1998.
An ordinary least squares regression finds that the coefficients of PI SHARE
and  APPROVAL have the  expected negative sign in every case, as reported
in table  3.  The coefficients are,  however, insignificant for the  longer period
1994-1998. For the  shorter period 1997-1998 the coefficient on PI SHARE is
-0.0393 and statistically significant on the five-percent level. The coefficient on
APPROVAL is -0.0125 and  significant at  the five-percent level. Thus, the  re-
gressions further support  the  model of accommodation with  a lagged reaction
to parallel imports.  Although the effect of parallel imports on manufacturers'
prices is significantly negative it is worth  noting that  the  size of the  effect is
relatively small.  Further,  these variables do not  explain  much of the  varia-
tion in prices, as the adjusted  R2 for the OLS-regression with PI  SHARE and
APPROVAL are 0.04 and 0.03, respectively.
[SEE TABLE 3]
3.3  Price  Convergence  and Rents
So far the  empirical analysis has focused on the effects of parallel imports in
the  home market.  More generally, however, we are interested in the  effects of
parallel trade  on the price differential between the  export and import markets.
In both the deterrence and accommodation cases we expect prices between the
two markets to converge.
To test this hypothesis we use bilateral price comparisons  between the Swedish
market and the two main export markets, Italy and Spain.  Prices are wholesale
prices, that  is, prices quoted to pharmacies, in U.S. dollars in 1994 and  1998.
These data  include at  least one pair of prices for 28 of the  top 50 molecules.
Nine of the  products  were subject  to  parallel trade  from one or  both  of the
export markets.  Regional varieties in the Swedish market that  lack comparable
products in the export market were excluded from the sample.
Relative prices for Italy and Spain were calculated on a product-by-product
basis for 1994 and  1998. The relative price for a specific product  is defined as
the  dollar  price in the  export country divided by the  dollar price in Sweden.
The price change is defined as the relative price in 1998 minus the relative price
in 1994. Price convergence  with this definition occurs when the  price change is
positive.
18The dependent  variable is the change of the relative price in Italy or Spain
for all bilateral comparisons. The exogenous variable is a dummy, PI TRADE,
which is one when parallel trade between the export and import country occurs
and zero otherwise.
The  estimated  coefficient for PI TRADE  was 0.0180 for Italy,  0.0206 for
Spain and 0.0176 for the  pooled data.  All three  estimated  parameters  are in-
significantly different from zero. Hence, the data do not support  the hypothesis
that  prices for products  subject to parallel trade  converge between the export
and import countries. More specifically,  we conclude that  manufacturing firms'
prices in Italy and Spain relative to Sweden did not converge during the period
1994-1998. Substantial  price differences for parallel-traded  products  remained.
Indeed, the  average price across Italy and Spain of these goods was 68 percent
of the average price in Sweden.
Moreover, we can approximately estimate the  difference between the  price
in the  export  market and  the  price set by the  parallel-importing  firm in the
import  market.  Table 4 summarizes the  parallel-importing firms'  prices for
products  subject to such imports.  The relative price in 1998 is defined as the
price set  by the parallel- importing  firm divided by the  price charged by the
manufacturing  firm for the  same product.  The average relative price  set by
the  parallel-importing  firms in 1998 was 89 percent  of the  price  set  by the
manufacturing  firms in Sweden.  The minimum relative price was 85 percent
and the maximum 92 percent.
[SEE TABLE 4]
Given these figures, we estimate the  parallel-importing firms' margin to be
approximately 21 percent of the  original manufacturer's  price in the  Swedish
market.  The margin for parallel imports from Italy  ranged  from nine  to 39
percent  while the margin for parallel imports from Spain ranged from nine to
31 percent. Rents to the parallel-importing firms, or alternatively real resources
used in the  arbitrage activities,  are, therefore, considerable compared  to  the
price reduction in the home market.
Finally, we use the margin and price effects to estimate the impact of parallel
trade  on consumer surplus and the  rents that  are shifted from manufacturing
firns to parallel-importing firms. The effect of parallel imports on the manufac-
turing firms' prices is -1.2 percent for the unweighted average and -3.3 percent
for the weighted average, compared to  products  not subject  to  parallel trade
over the  period 1994-1998.  Assuming that  pharmaceuticals are  normal goods,
19we obtain  an upper  bound of the  positive effect on consumer surplus in 1998
by using the  quantity  consumed at  the  lower, parallel-import-induced prices,
evaluated  at  fictitious prices had  there  been no parallel imports.  The differ-
ence between the fictitious expenditure and the  actual expenditure is the  effect
on consumer surplus.  In  this  regard,  the static  effect of parallel  imports on
consumer surplus in 1998 is estimated  to be  a  gain of  150 million SEK with
unweighted price changes and 199 million SEK with weighted price changes.
The rents to parallel-importing firms (which include costs of the activity) are
calculated using the actual  margin between these firms' prices in Sweden and
wholesale  prices in the export market (Italy or Spain), multiplied by the quantity
of parallel-imported  drugs.  In  cases where the  export  price  is missing it  is
replaced with the average export price, which is 68 percent of the manufacturing
firm's wholesale price in Sweden.  Using these margins, we calculate the rents
to parallel importers to be approximately 188 million SEK in 1998. Note that
these rents  are of the same magnitude as the consumer surplus gain.
4  Conclusion
We developed a model of manufacturer  behavior in the  presence of potential
parallel imports.  In the deterrence outcome we expect the manufacturing firm's
price of a  product  that  is subject  to such competition  to  drop  in the  home
market,  though no actual  imports would occur.  More specifically, we expect
the price of products subject to potential  arbitrage to drop relative to prices of
products that  are not subject to potential parallel imports in the home market.
In the accommodation equilibrium we expect the manufacturing  firm's price to
fall as the volume of parallel iimiports  rises.
The Swedish market provides a natural  laboratory  in which to investigate
our theoretical  findings. The growth of parallel imports from 1995 to 1998 was
considerable and accounted for 16 percent of the sales in our sample in 1998. A
large number of parallel-importing firms entered the  market,  in some cases to
sell the  same products  as other such firms already present.  However, parallel-
trade sales were dominated by four major firms. Parallel trade was concentrated
on a minority of the products in the  sample but its share was considerable for
up to  15 percent of major drugs.The  source countries were primarily Italy  and
Spain.
The empirical analysis  confirned  that  prices of goods subject  to  import
20competition,  including parallel-traded products  themselves, fell approximately
4 percent  in the  import  market relative to the  prices of products  not  subject
to parallel trade.  Approximately three quarters of this reduction resulted from
parallel trade  itself while the remaining effect was the  change in the  manufac-
turing firms' prices. The simple tests for differences in price changes suggested
that  the accommodation reaction came with a lag, as the price reductions were
significantly different in the shorter period 1997-1998  than in the  full period.
The data  fail to support  the hypothesis that  prices for products  subject to
parallel trade  converge between the  exporting and  importing  countries.  Our
results suggest that  parallel-importing firms exploit a price difference between
these markets of approximately 21 percent of the original manufacturer's  price
in Sweden. Rents to the parallel-importing firms, or alternatively real resources
used in arbitrage,  are, therefore, considerable compared to the  price effect in
the home market.
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22Table  1: The  Pharmaceutical  Market  in  Sweden  1995-1998,.
Sweden  1995  1996  1997  1998
Gross Domestic  Product (MSEK)  1.649.922  1.688.200  1.738.859  1.816.042
Total pharmaceutical  sales (MSEK)  13.393  15.808  14.263  16.567
Sales of top 50 molecules  (MSEK)  4.576  5.977  5.201  6.203
Parallel imports (MSEK)  0  >0  269  1.007
Parallel imports of top 50 (MSEK)  0  >0  269  920
C50  by molecule  0.34  0.38  0.36  0.37
Parallel imports/Total sales  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.06
Parallel imports/Top 50 sales  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.16
Concentration  ratio (C1)  n/a  1.00  0.85  0.59
Concentration  ratio (C4)  n/a  1.00  1.00  0.96
Total number of P.I. approvals  0  1  45  226
P.I. approvals  for top 50 molecules  0  1  31  131
Total number of P.I. firms  0  1  4  10
Source: Statistics  on approvals compiled from data  obtained from the Medical Product  Agency
(http://www.mpa.se),  "Approvals"  and sales statistics compiled from LIF data  (http://www.lif.se).
Note:  C50 is defined as the fraction of the  sales of the top  50 molecules of total  sales of phar-
maceuticals.  Sales are  in nominal wholesale prices, i.e.  price to  pharmacy (AIP),  incl vet and
excl extempore.  An observation of an approval is defined as a formal approval to a specific firm
to parallel  import a unique patented  molecule in a specific form and dose from a specified export
country.
23Table  2:  Price  changes  of pharmaceuticals  in  Sweden  1995-1998.
Unweighted  average  Weighted  average
Sweden  1994-1998 1997-1998 1994-1998 1997-1998
All products Mean  incl. PI  0.06636  0.00253  0,00800  -0.01370
(0.1344)  (0.0352)  (0.0276)  (0.0061)
Manuf.'s  price  0.07336  0.00731  0.02791  -0.00156
(0.1330)  (0.0308)  (0.0217)  (0.0032)
PI products  Mean incl. P1  0.02881  -0.03117  -0.04384  -0.03846
(0.1213)  (0.0409)  (0.0448)  (0.0086)
Manuf.'s  price  0.06381  -0.00343  0.00308  -0.00668
(0.1199)  (0.0349)  (0.0360)  (0.0052)
Non-PI prod Mean  0.07574  0.00955  0.03646  0.00150
(0.1365)  (0.0296)  (0.0171)  (0.0035)
No. of obs.  125  151  125  151
Source: Author's calculations based on data  from LIF (http://www.lif.se).
Note:  Std dev in parentheses.  Data  includes 164 different forms and dosages distributed  over 50
patented  molecules. The relative price changes are calculated for each unique package. The price
change for all firms selling a unique product is a weighted average of the manufacturing firm's price
and the parallel importing firm's price.
24Table  3:  The  effects  of P.I.  on the  manufacturing  firm's  prices.
Manufactureur's  price change in the import  market from base-year to 1998
1994  1994  1994  1997  1997  1997
CONST.  0.0808***  0.0747***  0.0808***  0.0115***  0.0094***  0.0115***
(0.0152)  (0.0127)  (0.0151)  (0.0030)  (0.0026)  (0.0030)
PI SHARE  0.0073  -0.0217  - -0.0266  -0.0393**  -
(0.0830)  (0.0729)  (0.0186)  (0.0163)
APPROVAL  -0.0206  - -0.0194  -0.0084  - -0.0125**
(0.0279)  (0.0244)  (0.0059)  (0.0052)
No. of obs.  125  125  125  151  151  151
Adj.  R2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.03
Source: Author's calculations based on data  from LIP (http://www.lif.se).
Note:  Std  err in parentheses.  Data  includes 164 different forms and dosages distributed  over 50
patented  molecules. The relative price changes are calculated for each unique package.
25iable  4:  Prices  of  parallel  imports  and  parallel  importing  firms'
markups  in  1998
Price relative to manufacturing  firm's price in Sweden
PI to Sweden from Italy  PI to Sweden from Spain
Relative price  Mean  Max  Obs.  Mean  Max  Obs
in 1998  (std.  dev.)  Min  (std.  dev.)  Min
PI price in Sweden  0.8917  0.9155  28  0.8917  0.9155  28
(0.0125)  0.8506  (0.0125)  0.8506
PI price in export market  0.6819  0.8258  7  0.6786  0.7874  8
(0.1145)  0.5095  (0.0683)  0.5919
PI markup  0.2140  0.3890  7  0.2116  0.3071  8
(0.1136)  0.0897  (0.0749)  0.0913
Source: Author's  calculations based on data  from LIF (http://www.lif.se).
Note: Std. dev. in parentheses. The relative PI price in Sweden is defined as the parallel importing
firm's price relative to the price set by the manufacturing firm.The narrow sample includes molecules
with price obserations in the export market (Italy or Spain).
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